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Change in work-family reconciliation policy in France and the UK since 2008: the influence of 
economic crisis and austerity 
 
Work-family reconciliation policy - understood here to include the provision or subsidy of childcare 
services, parental leaves and the right to request flexibility at work for care responsibilities に has 
been undergoing a process of convergence across Europe in the last twenty years with latecomer 
countries which had hitherto had little provision in this area, such as Germany, the UK and the 
NWデｴWヴﾉ;ﾐSゲが さI;デIｴｷﾐｪ ┌ヮざ ┘ｷデｴ W;ヴﾉ┞ HｷヴS Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ Fヴ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS  “I;ﾐSｷﾐ;┗ｷ; ┘ｷデｴ デｴWｷヴ 
extensive provisions aﾗヴ IｴｷﾉSI;ヴW ;ﾐS ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗W ふゲWW aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW Bﾗﾐﾗﾉｷが ヲヰヱンき OげBヴｷWﾐが ヲヰヱンき 
Morgan, 2013). That said, significant divergences remain between countries due to their historical 
pathway legacies which establish how the state, market, culture and family interact (Kvist, 2013; 
OげBヴｷWﾐが ヲヰヱンき Pa;┌-EaaｷﾐｪWヴが ヲヰヰヴぶく Iﾐ ヲヰヰΒが デｴｷゲ Iﾗﾐ┗WヴｪWﾐIW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ IﾗﾐaヴﾗﾐデWS ; さIヴｷデｷI;ﾉ 
ﾃ┌ﾐIデ┌ヴWざ ふPｷWヴゲﾗﾐが ヲヰヰヴぶ ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa デｴW ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐ SWHデ Iヴｷゲｷゲが IﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲﾉﾗ┘Sﾗ┘ﾐ 
and ensuing austerity measures witnessed across Europe (Ollier-Malaterre, Valcour, Den Dulk & 
Kossek, 2013) which exacerbated pre-existing pressures on social policies, limiting their expansion 
and threatening their maintenance (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2014). However, it appears that 
work-family reconciliation policy has emerged relatively unscathed from this process (Baird & 
OげBヴｷWﾐが ヲヰヱヵき GﾗヴﾐｷIﾆが ヲヰヱヵき Mﾗゲゲ わ DW┗Wﾐが ヲヰヱヵぶが デｴｷゲ ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞ HWｷﾐｪ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデWS aﾗヴ 
by the fact that expenditure in this area is limited (in contrast with spending on health, pensions and 
social security benefits) in relation to the electoral benefit it can bring to parties in office (Bonoli, 
2013). Furthermore, work-family reconciliation policy and the early-┞W;ヴゲげ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ 
it have been considered firmly as a social investment rather than a cost (Kvist, 2013). Indeed, 
ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ﾏ;┞ HW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ W┗Wﾐ ﾏﾗヴW ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ ｷﾐ ｴ;ヴS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI デｷﾏWゲ ;ゲ ; 
protection against poverty and benefit dependency if the male breadwinner were to become 
unemployed. 
All that said, even if post-2008 economic problems have not put a halt to the development of 
reconciliation policy or caused a reversal of the convergence trend, it is likely that these 
circumstances will have interacted with other policy drivers to influence the nature of change during 
this period in path-dependent ways. In order to evaluate such a supposition, this article will 
systematically review and compare changes in work-family reconciliation policy since 2008 in two 
contrasting case-ゲデ┌S┞ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが ﾐ;ﾏWﾉ┞ デｴW さW;ヴﾉ┞ HｷヴSざ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ Fヴ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS デｴW さﾉ;デWIﾗﾏWヴざ 
country, the UK.
1
  These two countries have traditionally had very different policy histories and 
normative assumptions about the respective work-care responsibilities of citizens and the state but  
had undergone a significant convergence up until 2008 (Milner, 2010).
2
  Traditionally in all relevant 
typologies, France and the UK are placed in different categories: France has been labelled a 
conservative welfare regime (Esping-Anderson, 1999), a modified male-breadwinner state (Lewis, 
1992) and an optional familialist state (Leitner, 2003). France developed measures in the 1970s to 
enable women to combine employment and motherhood, a policy framed by the need to increase 
                                                          
1
 These figures are derived from an analysis of data from EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) by Bradshaw et al, 2015. 
2
 France has been visited on a number of occasions in the last few years by UK childcare ministers looking for 
best practice. For example, in September 2015 Sam Gyimah, on the occasion of one such visit to Paris 
;ﾐﾐﾗ┌ﾐIWS さくくく ｷﾐ Fヴ;ﾐIW ｴｷｪｴ-quality childcare is central to efforts to support families to balance their work 
;ﾐS ｴﾗﾏW ﾉｷaWく Tｴ;デげゲ ┘ｴ┞ Iげﾏ ﾆWWﾐ デﾗ aｷﾐS ﾗ┌デ ┘ｴ;デ ┘ﾗヴﾆゲ aﾗヴ デｴWﾏぐくざ DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ ES┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “;ﾏ 
G┞ｷﾏ;ｴ MP ふヲヰヱヵぶ さ“;ﾏ G┞ｷﾏ;ｴ ┗ｷゲｷデゲ P;ヴｷゲ デﾗ ゲｴ;ヴW HWゲデ ヮヴ;IデｷIW ｷﾐ IｴｷﾉSI;ヴWざが 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sam-gyimah-visits-paris-to-share-best-practice-in-childcare.,the UK 
Childcare Minister, 
both the labour force and birth rate and embedded in a tradition of the state having a broad 
legitimacy for intervention in the family (Haut Conseil de la Famille, 2011). Meanwhile, the UK has 
been labelled a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999), traditionally a male breadwinner 
state (Lewis, 1992) and an implicit defamilialising regime (Leitner, 2003). During the 1970s and 1980s 
デｴW ゲデ;デW SｷS ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐデWヴ┗WﾐW WｷデｴWヴ デﾗ WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW ﾗヴ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ 
market. It was not until 1997 that reconciliation policy began to develop in the country as part of the 
social-democratic project of New Labour, informed by gender equality considerations, but also firmly 
rooted in a third-way social investment and activation policy model. In terms of childcare coverage, 
significant differences remain between the two countries: in 2013 in full-time equivalent terms, 
childcare coverage for 3-5 year olds was only 50 per cent in the UK (headcount: 73 per cent) but 88 
per cent in France (head count: 100 per cent). The FTE coverage rate for 0-2 years olds was only 15 
per cent in the UK (headcount: 30 per cent) whereas it was 47 per cent in France (headcount: 52 per 
cent).
3
   TｴWゲW SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾉ;ﾐSゲI;ヮWゲ ｴ;┗W ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWS ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴe 
two countries: the gender employment gap is lower in France (7 points) than in the UK (9.5 points) 
within a lower overall employment rate (65 per cent in France and 74 per cent in the UK). The overall 
gender earnings gap is also lower in France at 32.9 per cent compared with 47.6 per cent in the UK,
4
  
explained in great part by the higher incidence of part-time work amongst women in the UK (41 per 
cent) than in France (30 per cent).
5
  
Furthermore, the two countries have had opposing political trajectories since 2008: in France, the 
right-wing administration of Nicolas Sarkozy was in government in the first post-crisis years but lost 
power in 2012 to the Socialist administration of François Hollande. Conversely, the Labour Party was 
in power in the UK until 2010 when the Conservative-led Coalition government took office. The 
Conservatives have been governing alone since 2015. The two countries differ also in terms of the 
impact of the crisis and their response to it as concerns public spending. According to the World 
Bank
6
  in 2007 France and the UK had similar growth rates at 2.4 and 2.6 per cent of GDP 
respectively. However, although France fared better than the UK in terms of growth during the 
2008-2011 period, between 2012 and 2014, UK GPD rose by between 1.2 and 2.9 per cent per 
annum whereas in France the increase in all three years was below 0.7 per cent. Austerity cuts to 
public spending have been more severe in the UK than in France. In 2008, France devoted 52.7 per 
cent of its GDP to public spending against 47.3 per cent in the UK. By 2014, this initial difference had 
grown significantly with France devoting 57.2 per cent of GDP to public spending against 44.4 per 
cent in the UK (INSEE, 2014; INSEE 2016). Up until 2014 the French government relied mostly on tax 
increases to control their budget deficit whereas the stated aim of the UK Coalition was to cut public 
expenditure rapidly and redefine the contours of the welfare state, this being portrayed as an 
さ┌ヴｪWﾐデ デヴ┌デｴざ ;ﾐS ﾃ┌ゲデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ; ヴWゲｷS┌;ﾉ welfare-state model (Farnsworth & Irving, 2011). 
However, in a change of tack in 2014 the French government announced the objective of reducing 
public spending by 50 billion euros by 2017. 
Analytical frameworks 
In order to undertake this analysis, the article will first describe the changes which have taken place 
in work-a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐIｷﾉｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷﾐ Fヴ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS デｴW UK ゲｷﾐIW ヲヰヰΒ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ;ｷS ﾗa H;ﾉﾉげゲ ふヱΓΓンぶ 
framework which defines three levels of policy change:  adjustments to the settings of policy 
                                                          
3
 These figures are derived from an analysis of data from EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) by Bradshaw et al, 2015 
4
 Figures for 2015 (European Union, 2016). 
5
 Figures for 2015 (European Commission, 2016) 
6
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, 
instruments which represent first order change
7
 ; changes to or the introduction of new techniques 
or policy instruments which represents second-order change;
8
   and lastly, the recasting of the 
overarching goals that guide policy which represents third-order change, also referred to as 
paradigmatic change.
9
  Second, the article will assess the extent to and the ways in which the 
economic crisis and austerity in combination with other drivers have influenced work-family 
reconciliation policy in each national context since 2008. In order to do this, the article will refer to a 
range of socio-economic, political, institutional and cultural explanations organised within Mätzke 
;ﾐS OゲデﾐWヴげゲ ふヲヰヱヰ;き ヲヰヱヰHぶ aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ aﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ Iｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞く Tｴｷゲ aヴamework 
applies a twofold distinction, the first aspect of which differentiates between material as opposed to 
ideational explanations of policy change whilst the second distinguishes between the role of societal 
as opposed to political actors. This produces four categories of explanation. In the material / societal 
category, socio-WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ﾐW┘ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ヮヴﾗS┌IW ふﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ 
employment; the ageing population; child poverty) often lie at the root of policy change. However, 
given that similar problems are addressed in different ways and at different times in particular 
countries, alone they cannot account for such change. Indeed, even the identification of a certain 
situation as problematic is not a neutral process. Important also in explaining policy change is the 
ability of particular social groups and organized interests (feminist groups; family associations; 
business lobby) to gain access to political influence to promote particular types of policy action. In 
the material / political category, policy change may be explained by a change of actors responsible 
for decision-making (political parties; bureaucratic elites) or by shifts in the composition and/or 
ideologies of political parties in power or opposition. Material factors alone, however, cannot 
explain policy change and it is necessary also to consider ideational explanations. In the ideational / 
ゲﾗIｷWデ;ﾉ I;デWｪﾗヴ┞が ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ Iｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪ ;デデｷデ┌SWゲ ;ﾐS ｷSW;ﾉゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ヮ;ヴWﾐデｴﾗﾗS ;ﾐS Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ;ヴW 
of course very important in determining what kind of change the public will tolerate or indeed 
militate for. However, these in turn are subject to influence by organized interests and politicians, 
and indeed the practical and symbolic effects of existing policy itself. In the ideational / political 
I;デWｪﾗヴ┞ ｷゲ デﾗ HW aﾗ┌ﾐS デｴW ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗa さヴｴWデﾗヴｷI ;Iデｷﾗﾐざが ; ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ┘ｴWヴWH┞ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;Iデﾗヴゲ Wゲヮﾗ┌ゲW 
and promote ideas which appeal to the moral intuition of societal actors to convince them that 
IWヴデ;ｷﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ;ヴW ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ ふデｴW さ┌ヴｪWﾐデ デヴ┌デｴざ ﾗa ;┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞き さaヴWW IｴﾗｷIWざ ﾗa IｴｷﾉSI;ヴW 
options). Furthermore, epistemic communities, transnational networks of professionals with a 
justified claim to policy knowledge (academics, policy experts) have an important ideational role to 
play in defining the problematic nature of a social phenomenon and advising on policy responses to 
it. In sum, therefore, we need to understand how this range of material and ideational factors and 
societal and political actors interact to allow new social challenges to be defined, policy proposals to 
address these challenges to be elaborated and such proposals to be enacted.  
Work-family reconciliation policy in France and the UK prior to 2008 
In order to understand how historical pathway legacies might have affected policy change since 
2008, the development of work-family reconciliation policy in each country prior to 2008 will be 
discussed. Until the late 1990s there was a gulf separating France and the UK on this issue (Lewis, 
                                                          
7
 For example, benefit levels, eligibility rules 
8
 Work-family reconciliation policy is constituted of a number of different types of policy instruments the 
principal ones of which are: provision of childcare places, subsidies for purchasing childcare, parental-leave 
rights and parental-leave benefits and rights to flexibility at work (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2014) 
9
 For example, Mazur (2002) identifies three possible goals for work-family reconciliation policy: (i) to make 
stay-at-home mothers financially independent from デｴWｷヴ ｴ┌ゲH;ﾐSゲげ ゲ;ﾉ;ヴｷWゲき ふｷｷぶ デﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW デｴ;デ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ 
primary parenting role does not prevent them participating in employment; (iii) to redefine gender roles, 
aﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾗﾐ ﾏWﾐげゲ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉ;Hﾗur market. 
2013). On the one hand, the French state had enjoyed wide legitimacy to intervene in family life 
since the beginning of the welfare state (Fagnani & Math, 2011). From its inception, the social 
security system had organised a transfer of resources from the childless to families with children 
┘ｴｷIｴ ｪ;┗W ; Hヴﾗ;S ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ デﾗ ゲデ;デW ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデく Iﾐ ヱΓΑヲ デｴW さ;ﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ 
ヮﾗ┌ヴ aヴ;ｷゲ SW ｪ;ヴSWざ10  was introduced whilst local authorities ran means-tested and subsidised 
crèches for the under threes and children from three to school agW Iﾗ┌ﾉS ;デデWﾐS デｴW さYIﾗﾉW 
ﾏ;デWヴﾐWﾉﾉWざ11   for free. Such assistance was justified within a natalist framework which secured 
support for work-family reconciliation measures from across the political spectrum:  the perceived 
demographic weakness of the country meant that the state needed to ensure that women both 
remained in the workforce and brought up children (Jenson, 1986). Gender equality as a frame of 
reference played a subordinate role only in this process and work-family reconciliation remained 
anchored in a notion of maternalism (Bonoli, 2013; Mazur, 2002; White, 2004). This longevity of 
state support for working mothers explains to a great extent the social acceptability of placing a 
child of under three in full-time childcare in France (Fagnani & Math, 2011). In similarity to France, 
the notion of maternalism has strongly influenced the UK welfare state but in contrast, the British 
liberal tradition has led to a reluctance to intervene in the family lives of citizens, whether to 
discourage or encouragW ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ふFﾉWIﾆWﾐゲデWｷﾐ わ “WWﾉWｷH-Kaiser, 2011; Haux, 2011).  
In the UK work-family reconciliation policy did not develop until the late 1990s despite the fact that 
ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ｴ;S ｪヴﾗ┘ﾐ ゲデヴﾗﾐｪﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΓΒヰゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗ┗Wヴ ｴ;ﾉa ﾗa ;ﾉﾉ ﾏﾗデｴWrs with children 
under five being economically active by the early 1990s (Sly, 1994). The Conservative administration 
in the 1980s had considered the family to be an exclusively private matter with policy intervention 
restricted to targeting support for chｷﾉSヴWﾐ ｷﾐ ﾐWWSく  TｴW デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ さﾏ;ﾉW HヴW;S┘ｷﾐﾐWヴざ 
ﾏﾗSWﾉ ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ ;Iデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWSが H┌デ ﾐWｷデｴWヴ ┘;ゲ デｴWヴW ;ﾐ┞ ;デデWﾏヮデ デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐW ｷデく MﾗデｴWヴゲげ 
employment had to be managed within the resources of the household, often with recourse to part-
time work and informal networks of family, friends and neighbours, the voluntary provision of pre-
school education and private market childcare. Local authorities provided some part-time nursery 
education for pre-school children and through the decade the number of four-year olds in primary 
school reception classes grew (Lewis, 2013).  
Both countries saw considerable change to the reconciliation landscape through the 1990s which 
started the process of convergence between them. In France new reconciliation policy instruments 
were developed from the late 1980s as new policy goals were grafted on to existing ones. In the 
context of the unemployment crisis of the time and without a strong gender-egalitarian frame to 
protect it, reconciliation policy began to be dictated by employment policy which sought to de-
activate certain sectors of the workforce, including mothers of young children in pursuit of the goal 
ﾗa さ┘ﾗヴﾆ-ゲｴ;ヴｷﾐｪざ ふBﾗﾐﾗﾉｷが ヲヰヱンき F;ｪﾐ;ﾐｷ わ M;デｴが ヲヰヰΓき M;ヴデｷﾐが ヲヰヱヰぶく TｴW ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮ;ﾉ Iｴ;ﾐｪW ┘;ゲ デｴW 
introduction of a parental leave benefit - デｴW AﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ SげES┌I;デｷﾗﾐ P;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉW ふAPEぶ 12 - by the 
Socialists in 1985 to complement the right to parental leave. The benefit allowed for a long leave up 
the third birthday of the child paid at a low flat rate, replacing less than 15 per cent of average 
earnings (OECD, 2014a). Initially the APE was only available for the third child. It was denounced by 
aWﾏｷﾐｷゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ;ゲ ; さﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ ┘;ｪWざ ｷﾐ Sｷゲｪ┌ｷゲW H┌デ ┘WﾉIﾗﾏWS H┞ C;デｴﾗﾉｷI-influenced family 
associations such as the Union Nationale des Associations Familiales (UNAF)
13
  (Fagnani, 2000). Once 
in power, the right-wing government developed around the APE what was to become the 
justificatory frame of reconciliation policy goals for the ensuing thirty years: the provision of 
                                                          
10
 Benefit for childcare costs 
11
 Nursery school which had existed since the late nineteenth century 
12
 Education-by-Parents Benefit 
13
 Since 1945, the UNAF had been an institutional partner advising on all areas of family policy. 
freedom of choice for families in terms of how to combine employment and child rearing (Martin, 
2010).  In terms of policy instruments, this meant that the state supported equally mothers who 
wanted to stay at home with their young children 
14
  and those who wanted to remain in the 
workforce. The APE was extended to the second child in 1994 and offered on a part-time basis. In 
2004 under a right-wing government, paid parental leave was extended to parents of one child, but 
only for one year and the reconciliation policy package as a whole was reconfigured and renamed to 
render explicit this notion of choice for families. For example, the APE become the Complement de 
LｷHヴW Cｴﾗｷ┝ SげAIデｷ┗ｷデY ふCLCAぶく15   L;ゲデﾉ┞が ｷﾐ ヲヰヰヲ デ┘ﾗ ┘WWﾆゲげ ヮ;デWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾉW;┗W ┘;ゲ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWSく Aﾏﾗﾐｪゲデ 
OECD countries, France has had the highest degree of diversification of work-family reconciliation 
ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ┘ｷデｴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ HWﾐWaｷデｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ ; さSﾗ┌HﾉW aヴWW IｴﾗｷIWざぎ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ 
leave and childcare for the under threes, but also between a wide range of individualised or 
collective childcare options (Thévenon, 2011a). Alongside the introduction of the parental leave 
benefit and the continuing provision of nursery schools and local-authority run crèches, through the 
1980s and 1990s France sought to increase the number of childcare places by supporting the use of 
individual and flexible forms of childcare -  particularly childminding - through universal benefits for 
dual-earner parents and single-parent families and tax breaks rather than increasing investment in 
IヴXIｴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘;ゲ ﾏﾗヴW Iﾗゲデﾉ┞く Iﾐ ヱΓΒヶ デｴW AﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ SW ｪ;ヴSW Sげ┌ﾐ Wﾐa;ﾐデ < SﾗﾏｷIｷﾉW 
(AGED) 
16
 ┘;ゲ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWS aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS H┞ デｴW AｷSW < ﾉ; a;ﾏｷﾉﾉW ヮﾗ┌ヴ ﾉげWﾏヮﾉﾗｷ Sげ┌ﾐW ;ゲゲｷゲデ;ﾐデW ﾏ;デWヴﾐWﾉﾉW 
agréée  (AFAEMA)
17
 in 1990. These benefits were combined to become the Complément de Libre 
Choix de Mode de Garde (CLCMG) 
18
 in 2004. Indeed, childminding has become the most used type 
of care for the under threes (Observatoire national de la petite enfance, 2016). All that said, from 
the early 2000s more cash was injected into nursery schools and crèches following increased 
demand for collective childcare with available places rising 2.9 per cent per year between 2003 and 
2007 (Fagnani & Math, 2011). 
In the UK, the New Labour government, elected in 1997, began the process of convergence with 
early-bird states such as France as the most radical changes to parental rights since the second 
world-war were enacted (Morgan, 2013), bringing about a paradigmatic change in the goals of policy 
and giving the state responsibility for work-family matters (Lewis & Campbell, 2007). The following 
policy instruments were introduced: Local Education Authorities were obliged to provide a free part-
time place (12.5 hours per week) for 4 year olds extended to 3 year olds in 2004 with hours 
extended to 15 per week in 2008.  The SureStart scheme provided collective childcare in targeted 
disadvantaged areas. Means-tested financial subsidies for childcare were also provided through a 
system of tax credits introduced in 1999 covering up to 70 per cent of childcare costs up to a ceiling 
per child which rose to 80 per cent in 2003. For families not entitled to tax credits, a tax efficient 
childcare voucher system was introduced in 2005 whereby employers could provide tax and National 
Insurance- free vouchers for childcare. Maternity leave was extended incrementally up to nine 
ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲげ ヮ;ｷS ;ﾐS デｴヴWW ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲげ ┌ﾐヮ;ｷS ﾉW;┗W H┞ ヲヰヰヶ ┘ｴｷﾉゲデ ｷﾐ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ デﾗ Fヴ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ ヲヰヰヲ デ┘ﾗ 
┘WWﾆげゲ ヮ;ｷS ヮ;デWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾉW;┗W ┘;ゲ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWSく L;ゲデﾉ┞が ｷﾐ ヲヰヰン ;ﾐ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WW さヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ ヴWケ┌Wゲデざ ヴWS┌IWS 
or flexible hours to accommodate childcare and other responsibilities was enacted (Daly, 2010; 
LW┘ｷゲが ヲヰヱンぶく DWゲヮｷデW デｴW ヴ;SｷI;ﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴWゲW ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲが デｴW ヮ;デｴ SWヮWﾐSWﾐI┞ ﾗa NW┘ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ 
approach  of combining neoliberalism with responses to emerging social needs and relying on the 
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 This is essentially the under-threes since all French children have the right to a place in nursery school from 
the age of three to school age with nearly all families sending their children to the maternelle. 
15
 Benefit for the free choice of economic activity 
16
 Benefit for minding a child at home 
17
 Support for families employing a registered childminder 
18
 Supplement for the free choice of child care option 
market to provide childcare, maintaining cash benefits at a low residual level and targeting help to 
lower income families through means-testing is evident (Daly, 2010). In terms of the justificatory 
frame of these developments, although gender equality was employed to a degree (Milner, 2010), in 
similarity to France, it was never the primary ideational frame. Whereas in France, natalism and the 
goal of work-sharing had helped shape reconciliation policy, increasingly over the course of the New 
Labour governments, policy was influenced by notions of increasing the active workforce as an anti-
poverty strategy and in relation to the responsibilities of social citizenship (Lewis, 2013). By 2008 in 
comparison to France the UK still had far less generous childcare and leave provisions: there was no 
ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ヮ;ｷS ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗W aﾗヴ a;デｴWヴゲ ﾗデｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ デｴW ゲデ;デ┌デﾗヴ┞ デ┘ﾗ ┘WWﾆゲげ ヮ;デWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾉW;┗Wき 
support for childcare for the under threes was limited as was state-funded early-years education, 
this being provided in the private rather than the state-education sector. Indeed, between 2005 and 
2009 the average number of weekly hours spent in formal childcare for children under three was 
28.9 in France but only 13.8 in the UK (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014). 
Changes to work-family reconciliation policy in France and the UK since 2008  
By 2008, material problems regarding two key areas of work-family reconciliation had been 
identified in France and the UKく Fｷヴゲデが Hﾗデｴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ ｴ;S ; ｴｷｪｴﾉ┞ さｪWﾐSWヴWSざ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ aﾗヴ IｴｷﾉSI;ヴW 
leave (Saxonberg, 2013): in France, the CLCA had neither a wage replacement rate high enough to 
WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW a;デｴWヴゲ デﾗ デ;ﾆW ｷデ ┌ヮ ふMﾗゲゲ わ DW┗Wﾐが ヲヰヱンぶが ﾐﾗヴ ; さa;デｴWヴ ケ┌ﾗデ;ざ ふデｴW ヴWゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗn of a 
IWヴデ;ｷﾐ ヮヴﾗヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾉW;┗W aﾗヴ さデｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデざが ; ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ Wﾏ;ﾐ;デｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW NﾗヴSｷI Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ 
in the 1990s) whilst in the UK only mothers had the right to extended leave. Second, both countries 
faced the question of affordability of and access to formal childcare principally for pre-school 
children 
19
, a situation which was constituting a disincentive to labour force participation particularly 
among less educated and unskilled women (Evertsson et al, 2009). In France, geographical 
disparities in childcare coverage for the under threes and differential pricing of individual as opposed 
to collective care were contributing to a social bifurcation of the female labour market whilst in the 
UK the high cost of childcare was a problem for a wide-range of families. The identification of these 
situations as problematic can be seen as part of an ideational change which Orloff (2010) describes 
;ゲ デｴW ざa;ヴW┘Wﾉﾉ デﾗ ﾏ;デWヴﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏざが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW ヴWﾃWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ﾏﾗSWﾉ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾆ-family reconciliation which 
focuses on helping mothers alone to combine employment with their caregiving role  in favour of 
ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ さ;S┌ﾉデ ┘ﾗヴﾆWヴざ ﾏﾗSWﾉ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ SWｪWﾐSWヴWS ;ﾐS ゲｴﾗヴデWヴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗Wゲ ;ﾐS W┝デWﾐゲｷ┗W 
and affordable childcare. Such an approach can also be related to the develﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW さヮﾗゲデ-
ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉ ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デWざ ふM;デ┣ﾆW ;ﾐS OゲデﾐWヴが ヲヰヱヰHぶ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW ゲデ;デW ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣Wゲ ;ﾐS ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ 
economically active adults, providing them with help to undertake their care responsibilities where 
necessary, and targets spending on social investments. 
Turning first to the question of parental leave and the case of France, a significant new policy was 
ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWSぎ デｴW PヴWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデ;ｪYW SげYS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ SW ﾉげWﾐa;ﾐデ ふPヴWP;ヴEぶ 20 which came into effect for 
babies born from 1st January 2015. The PreParE continues to give parents of one child one year of 
full or part-デｷﾏW ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗W ┌ﾐデｷﾉ デｴW IｴｷﾉSげゲ aｷヴゲデ HｷヴデｴS;┞が H┌デ デｴW さﾗデｴWヴざ ヮ;ヴWﾐデ ﾏ┌ゲデ デ;ﾆW ;デ 
least six months of the leave. For parents of two or more children, their previous entitlement to paid 
ﾉW;┗W ┌ヮ デﾗ デｴWｷヴ IｴｷﾉSげゲ デｴｷヴS HｷヴデｴS;┞ ｴ;ゲ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐWS ┌ﾐIｴ;ﾐｪWS H┌デ W;Iｴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデ ｷゲ ﾐﾗ┘ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ WﾐデｷデﾉWS 
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 In the UK statutory school age is five but children start school in reception classes normally in the September 
after their fourth birthday. In France, although the statutory school age is 6, almost all children attend the 
école maternelle from three years of age regardless of whether their parents work or not. Therefore in the UK 
there was a problem regarding both care for the under threes and as regards early-years education whereas in 
France the issue is with care of the under-threes. 
20
Shared benefit for raising children  
to a maximum of twenty-four months of leave per child to include postnatal-maternity and paternity 
leave. The benefit is still paid at a low flat rate
21
  meaning that the likelihood of significant father 
take-up is reduced and the maximum leave available to mothers remains long at two years. 
However, despite its limitations, this second-order change of policy instrument may be construed as 
the beginnings of a third-order policy change in that it is the first work-family reconciliation policy 
instrument in France to target directly the behaviour of fathers and begin to move the country away 
from the implicit maternalism that had previously characterised work-family reconciliation policy 
(Mazur, 2002; White, 2004). How and why, therefore, did this policy change come about and what 
effect, if any, did the economic crisis and austerity have on its form and the process of policy 
change? 
By the 2000s, the epistemic community of international academics and French policy experts had 
identified that the CLCA was contributing to two socio-economic problems: the lack of father 
involvement in child rearing and the distancing from the labour market of low-qualified and younger 
mothers (see for example, Afas, 1998; Algava et al, 2005; Fagnani 2000). Although in principle open 
to both parents and despite having a relatively long history, parental leave was highly gendered 
(Saxonberg, 2013). Around 97 per cent of those claiming the APE or later the CLCA were mothers 
(Boyer & Ceroux, 2012). Indeed, in 2013, the percentage of those taking up parental leave who were 
men in France was one of the lowest (15th out of 18) in the OECD (OECD, 2014a). The setting of the 
CLCA offering a low flat-rate payment was an important reason for this low father take-up: given the 
gender pay gap, families lose less money if the mother ceases to work. Furthermore, given that the 
leave has been mostly taken by mothers, and indeed by less qualified mothers, its length at up to 
three years for the second and subsequent children - one of the longest in the EU and OECD - came 
デﾗ HW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷIく ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS デｴ;デ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ﾐ ;HゲWﾐIW ┘W;ﾆWﾐゲ ; ┘ﾗﾏ;ﾐげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ 
the labour market for the rest of her career and has a detrimental effect on gender equality in the 
home (Afsas, 1998).  Recognition of these problems gained momentum within the French welfare 
elite during the 2000s with reports published highlighting the need to review the existing parental 
leave policy.
22
    
Arising from these reports was the introduction of a new policy instrument in 2006 which was, 
ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴ ﾉｷﾏｷデWS ｷﾐ ｷデゲ ヴW;Iｴぎ  デｴW CﾗﾏヮﾉYﾏWﾐデ ﾗヮデｷﾗﾐﾐWﾉ SW ﾉｷHヴW Iｴﾗｷ┝ Sげ;Iデｷ┗ｷデY ふCOLCAぶ 23 に a one-
year better remunerated leave which parents of three or more children could choose instead of the 
CLCA (Milner, 2010). One explanation of why more extensive change did not happen at that time is 
that although there had been partisan consensus in favour of the overarching policy goal of enabling 
mothers of dependent children to remain in the workforce since the 1970s in France, from the 1980s 
until the mid- to late-2000s, there had been a growing division of political opinion concerning the 
length of parental leave. Politicians on the right and centre and the powerful Union Nationale des 
Associations Familiales framed their support for maintaining long parental leaves in terms of 
さIｴﾗｷIWざ aﾗヴ a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲ デﾗ ゲデ;┞ ;デ ｴﾗﾏW ┌ﾐデｷﾉ IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ ｪﾗ デﾗ ﾐ┌ヴゲWヴ┞ ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉく Tｴｷゲ aヴ;ﾏW ┘;ゲ ┗Wヴ┞ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴ 
with the ヮ┌HﾉｷIく PﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ;ﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾉWaデ ;ﾐS aWﾏｷﾐｷゲデ ﾉﾗHH┞ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW L;Hﾗヴ;デﾗｷヴW SげEｪ;ﾉｷデY 
were in principle in favour of a shorter, better paid and better shared parental leave for all (White, 
2004) although left-wing governments to date had not made such changes. However, in 2009 a 
partisan convergence first on shortening and then on sharing of parental leave came about (Morgan, 
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In 2016 this was 390 euros per month which is 34 per cent of the net full-time (35 hour) minimum wage of 
1144 euros http://www.wageindicator.org/main/salary/minimum-wage/france  
22
   See for example a report by Michel Laroque, the General Inspector of Social Affairs in 2006: Congé parental 
fractionnable indemnisé, rapport no. 2006-97, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-
publics/064000687.pdf 
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 The optional supplement for the free choice of activity 
2013) when President Sarkozy proposed the reduction of parental-leave benefit for all parents to 
one year to be paid as a percentage of former income: he did not mention a father quota at that 
デｷﾏWく Tｴｷゲ ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗W ┘;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa “;ヴﾆﾗ┣┞げゲ ヮ;ヴ;Sｷｪﾏ;デｷI Iｴ;ﾐｪW ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ 
employment policy which renounced the previous strategy of work-sharing to reduce 
unemployment and adopted an active labour market strategy designed to increase the employment 
rate of the working-age population (Windebank, 2012), employment policy having been a strong 
influence on work-family reconciliation policy since the late 1980s. Tasked with making policy 
proposals, in 2011 the Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS) published recommendations 
which endorsed the reduction of the CLCA to one year and suggested a benefit of 60 per cent of 
previous salary. It added that two months of this leavW ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ヴWゲWヴ┗WS aﾗヴ デｴW さﾗデｴWヴざ ヮ;ヴWﾐデく Iﾐ 
the interim, the Council of the European Union had issued a directive in 2010 to all member states to 
ヮ┌デ ｷﾐデﾗ ヮﾉ;IW ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ ﾗﾐW ﾏﾗﾐデｴ ﾗa ; さa;デｴWヴ ケ┌ﾗデ;ざく Tｴｷゲ a;デｴWヴ ケ┌ﾗデ; ┘;ゲ ;IIWヮデWS H┞ デｴW 
government whｷIｴ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWS ; ┘ｴｷデW ヮ;ヮWヴ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ さWケ┌;ﾉ ゲｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ 
┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヮﾉWざ H┞ DWIWﾏHWヴ ヲヰヱヱ ふMｷﾐｷゲデXヴW SWゲ “ﾗﾉｷS;ヴｷデYゲ Wデ SW ﾉ; CﾗｴYゲｷﾗﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉWが ヲヰヱヱぶく 
However, before action could be taken, President Sarkozy lost the 2012 presidential elections. It was 
left to the Socialist administration of President Hollande to reform parental leave.  
As has been seen, the eventual policy was not as radical a change as that proposed in the IGAS 
report although the enactment of these proposals remains the longer-term aim of the Socialist 
government. The stated reason for not doing so was the cost of such a change in the light of the 
economic and budgetary situation: in 2011 it was estimated that the cost of implementing the IGAS 
plan and providing childcare places to compensate for this shortening of leave would have increased 
expenditure on the under threes from 0.7 to 1.2 per cent of GDP (Thévenon, 2011b). In contrast, if 
father take-up of the PreParE remains at previous low levels,
24
  this change of policy instrument has 
デｴW ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ﾗa ゲ;┗ｷﾐｪ Αヰ ﾏｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ W┌ヴﾗゲ H┞ ヲヰヱΑ H┞ ヴWS┌Iｷﾐｪ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ WﾐデｷデﾉWﾏWﾐデ デﾗ ﾉW;┗Wく25   This 
would be welcome as the Hollande government is looking to save up to 800 million euros from its 
family budget as part of its objective to cut spending by 50 billion euros between 2014 and 2017. 
Furthermore, due to the economic situation, there has been difficulty in developing enough 
childcare places for the under-threes to offset a more radical reduction in parental leave (see 
discussion below). Although these material constraints are very important, the decision not to enact 
a more far-reaching reform of parental leave must also be viewed in the light of the attachment of 
public opinion to the notion of free choice in work-family reconciliation as shown in opinion 
surveys
26
   and reactions to change or proposals for change on social media, opinion reinforced by 
groups such as the UNAF. This has made parties in office hesitant to make radical changes to 
parental level benefits.  
In the UK, parental leave policy in 2008 was still undeveloped in comparison to early-bird states such 
as France and indeed some latecomer countries such as Germany and highly gendered in that there 
┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ W┝デWﾐSWS ヮ;ｷS ﾉW;┗W ﾗヮWﾐ デﾗ a;デｴWヴゲ ;Hﾗ┗W デｴW デ┘ﾗ ┘WWﾆゲげ statutory paternity leave. Plans, 
however, were in hand to address this lacuna. The Labour government had outlined the Additional 
                                                          
24
 In the latest figures for December 2014 to December 2015, the first year of operation of the PreParE, there 
was an increase of 1.8 points in terms of fathers taking up parental leave : from 3.3 to 5.1 per cent. La lettre de 
LげOHゲWヴ┗;デﾗｷヴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ SW ﾉ; ヮWデｷデW Wﾐa;ﾐIWが ﾐﾗくヱ “WヮデWﾏHWヴ ヲヰヱヶが ヮくヴく 
https://www.caf.fr/sites/default/files/cnaf/LettreOnpeN1.pdf 
25




 Opinion surveys have showed that strong support for long parental leaves for mothers, for example, 
Kesteman (2009). 
Paternity Leave (APL) Regulations and Additional Statutory Paternity Pay (ASPPL) before leaving 
office, and the Coalition implemented these on election in 2010. Fathers and partners were not 
ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ WﾐデｷデﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ デﾗ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮ;デWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾉW;┗W H┌デ ｷﾐゲデW;S ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ 
ﾉW;┗W ;ﾐS ヮ;┞ ┘ｴWヴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;HﾉW ふﾐｷﾐW ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲげ ヮ;ｷS ﾉW;┗W ;ﾐS デｴヴWW ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲげ ┌ﾐヮ;ｷS ﾉW;┗Wぶ ┘ｴWn 
mothers returned to work during the maternity leave period. No gender-neutral parental leave as 
such was introduced. In 2013-14 only 1.4 per cent of eligible fathers took up this option.  However, 
this policy was further enhanced with the introduction of Shared Parental Leave (SPL) and Statutory 
Shared Parental Pay (SPPL) for children born since April 2015 which allows parents to share the 52 
┘WWﾆゲげ ﾉW;┗W ;ﾐS ンΓ ┘WWﾆゲ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ふ;デ グヱンΓ ヮWヴ ┘WWﾆ 27 or 90 per cent of previous income 
whichever is lower this is much more highly remunerated than its French equivalent) however they 
ゲWW aｷデく MﾗデｴWヴゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ｴ;┗W デﾗ デ;ﾆW デ┘ﾗ ┘WWﾆゲげ ﾏ;デWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾉW;┗W HWaﾗヴW “PL ;ﾐS “PPL I;ﾐ HW ﾗHデ;ｷﾐWS 
rather than the twenty weeks which was the case under the ALL / ASPPL. However there is an 
incentive for higher-paid mothers to take the first six weeks of leave as this is paid to them at 90 per 
cent of previous income without the £139 ceiling and organisations can of course enhance SPL 
benefits. Although a full review of the policy will not be made until 2018, indications are that father 
take-up remains low: data from HMRC shows that in the first quarter of 2016 only 2 per cent of 
those taking leave for childcare were men which is at the lower end of the government's forecast of 
an uptake of between 2 and 8 per cent (Allen, 2016). Leave cannot be taken on a part-time basis. 
Given that parental leave as such did not exist in the UK before 2010, and although a father quota or 
part-time option has not been introduced, the combined introduction of these two sets of policies 
can be viewed as a the beginnings of a paradigmatic shift away from maternalism and towards an 
adult worker model of work-family reconciliation. But why did this change come long after many of 
the other changes enacted by New Labour? And why was the leave not more radically degendered?  
The answer to these questions cannot be solely that the UK was a latecomer to work-family 
reconciliation: Germany, another latecomer country, has a scheme with both a father quota and a 
benefit paid at a high wage-replacement rate (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). When the 
policy was announced, the government stressed that the time was not right for more radical change 
ｪｷ┗Wﾐ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ふB;ｷヴS わ OげBヴｷWﾐが ヲヰヱヵぶが H┌デ ┘ｴｷﾉゲデ ﾐﾗデ Iommitting to further change as 
the French government has, neither was it ruled out. However, including a father quota would not 
necessarily have had cost implications, as we have seen in the French case. More important to take 
into account in explaining this lack of a father quota is that there was resistance from a range of 
political and societal actors to more radical change. First, such a coercive policy goes against the 
grain of Conservative ideas of freedom of choice for families. Indeed, the SPL was a project 
championed by the Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg. Now governing alone, when asked about the 
possibility of introducing a father quota after the 2018 policy review, the Conservative Secretary of 
State for Education, Nicky Morgan, stated that choice should be privileged over compulsion and that 
デｴW ゲデ;デW ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS さヴWゲヮWIデ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ぐく ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲげ IｴﾗｷIWゲ ﾗﾐ ぐくく デｴW ┘;┞ デｴW┞ ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW デｴW 
leaveざ.28  Second, the business lobby, which has a privileged position vis-à-vis influence on parties in 
office in the UK and on Conservative-party thinking in particular (see for example Fleckenstein and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011), has been in full agreement with state support for paid childcare, but has not 
been favourable to flexible parental leave. The Confederation for British Industry (CBI) strongly 
opposed both the APL and SPL, in both cases invoking the dangers of putting more pressure on 
businesses in the context of economic fragility when the need to protect employment is great. This is 
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 This payment is 60 per cent with the net minimum wage per week (based on a 35-hour week) of £232 in the 
UK 
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 TｴW WﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ;ﾐS Eケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ Cﾗmmittee inquiry into the gender pay gap which reported in March 2016 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/584/58403.htm# 
a view shared by the Conservatives and an argument that is more easily made in tough economic 
times. Lastly, the fact that the omitting of a father quota in the SPL passed with little to no significant 
public or press response is evidence that there is insufficient pressure from the electorate to bring 
about this sort of change quickly. 
The second set of problems which had come to the fore by the mid-2000s concerned the 
affordability of and access to formal childcare, with these problems taking different forms in France 
and the UK due to their differing policy legacies. Both countries were, however, working within the 
same institutional context of the EU targets on employment rates and childcare coverage. In France, 
academic studies and reports from the Caisse des Allocations Familiales (CAF) were highlighting the 
existence of a social bifurcation of the female labour market (Algava et al, 2005; Boyer & Ceroux, 
2012) whereby more highly qualified mothers tend to work on a full time or long-hours part time 
and continuous basis whereas lower qualified and younger mothers tend to take long parental 
leaves and risk becoming distanced from the labour market leading to future job insecurity and 
increased poverty risk. In 2010 amongst the poorest 20 per cent of families with a child under three 
91 per cent of children were looked after principally by their parents whereas this was the case for 
only 31 per cent of children in the 20 per cent of richest households (Boyer & Ceroux, 2012). The 
policy instruments and settings surrounding formal childcare support and provision contribute 
significantly to this problem: more highly qualified women have more childcare options: if municipal 
crèches are unavailable or unsuitable due to location or lack of flexibility,  they can use their higher 
salaries combined with the subsidies offered by the CLCMG to pay for individualised childcare which 
is more expensive, but more flexible and often in greater supply than crèches. For lower-paid 
women, individualised care is often still too expensive, despite the CLCMG, and crèche places, for 
which fees are means-tested, are either not available as availability varies dramatically across 
France, or do not correspond to their potential working hours.
29
  The identification of these 
problems has led to first order change in the form of investment in collective crèche facilities, 
particularly in more deprived areas. Indeed, investment in collective facilities, after having been 
reduced in favour of subsidising individual care arrangements in the 1990s underwent a resurgence 
in the new millenium (Fagnani, 2012) and from 2009 onwards, the reform of parental leave has been 
dependent on the expansion of formal childcare. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations 
have had ambitious objectives for increasing the overall supply of childcare places, both collective 
and individual, despite the economic crisis. The Plan Petite Enfance 2007-2012 aimed to generate an 
extra 100 000 childcare places by 2012, half collective and half individual, in part by loosening 
regulations regarding child-carer ratios and ensuring full occupancy of crèches but by 2011, only 13 
160 had been created. The Plan Crèches Espoir Banlieues also aimed to create 10 000 childcare 
places in deprived estates with extended opening of over ten hours per day to cater for those 
working a-typical hours (Boyer & Ceroux, 2012). The Hollande administration has had plans to create 
275,000 extra places for the under threes between 2013 and 2017 split equally between individual 
care (100 000), collective care (100 000) and to provide more places for the under threes in nursery 
schools (75 000 places) in order to increase the childcare coverage rate for this age group from 54 
per cent to 65 per cent.  The aim has also been to correct the territorial inequalities in childcare 
coverage which in 2012 ranged from nine to 80 per cent in different departments and to work in 
tandem with urban regeneration policy to improve cover for the most deprived areas (Haut Conseil 
de la Famille, 2014). However, progress has again been slow with only 19 per cent of the hoped-for 
increase having materialised by 2015 (Haut Conseil de la Famille, 2015). Chiefly to blame for these 
shortfalls has been the economic situation. The Haut Conseil de la Famille (HFC) has reported that 
                                                          
29
 The low qualified are more likely to be obliged to work irregular and non-standard hours than those who are 
more highly qualfied (Haut Conseil de la Famille, 2011). 
demand for individual care has fallen due to the recession since more parents and grandparents are 
unemployed and available for childcare within the family limiting the expansion of childminding 
services; reductions in standards of living have meant that families have had to reduce their 
childcare expenditure; and local authorities who are in charge of implementing the improvements in 
collective care have suffered budget cuts (Haut Conseil de la Famille, 2015). 
In addition to the plans to expand the availability of means-tested collective childcare places in order 
to reduce the social bifurcation of the female labour force, both administrations have made 
tentative moves away from the universality of the CLCMG and towards selectivity both by curtailing 
the entitlement of higher earners and increasing support for lower earners: in 2010 the Sarkozy 
administration increased the CLCMG by 10 per cent for those working atypical hours (Haut Conseil 
de la Famille, 2011) and in 2014 the Hollande administration reduced the CLCMG for those earning 
above an income ceiling leading to 6.1 per cent of claimants for childminders and 1.9 per cent of 
claimants for nannies experiencing a reduction in their benefits (Boisnaud & Fichen, 2015). Under 
discussion at the time of writing are plans to reduce the difference in cost to families of using 
childminders as opposed to crèches in order to address the problem of affordability of individual 
care for the lower paid. The HCF is proposing a unified system of financial aid for families without 
increasing the overall cost to the exchequer by making payments for childminders means-tested in 
the same way as are fees for crèches (Boisnaud & Fichen, 2015).  
To the fore of the public agenda in the UK has been the very high cost of childcare which affects the 
vast majority of families, not just the poorest as is the case in France. Indeed, childcare costs have 
risen much faster than wages or inflation in the UK since 2001 (Waldgrave, 2013). In difference to 
France, the vast majority of pre-school nursery provision for three and four year olds is in the private 
sector in the UK and only 15 hours per week of this provision is currently paid by the state. Indeed, 
by 2012, the UK was second only to Switzerland amongst OECD countries as regards the cost of 
childcare as percentage of average earnings (France ranked 18th in this exercise). Fagan & Norman 
(2014) note that according to the 2012 European Quality of Life Survey the cost of childcare was the 
main problem for 59 per cent of parents on average in Europe who would like take up employment 
but cannot, whereas in the UK this was the case for 73 per cent. In a bid to address this issue of 
affordability, a range of changes to policy settings and policy instruments have been enacted since 
2008 with the overall aim of lowering the cost of childcare to families, and particularly low-income 
families, by increasing government subsidy. First, free nursery provision for three and four year olds 
was extended to the poorest 20 per cent of two year olds in 2013 and again in 2014 to the poorest 
40 per cent. Furthermore, the Conservative government is from 2017 onwards adding a further 15 
hours of free childcare for three and four year olds to the universal entitlement of 15 hours to 
families where the parent / both parents work(s) (Department for Education, 2015). Other policy 
instrument changes have also come about but it is far from clear at this stage what the financial 
advantages of these will be for particular types of family. For example, the Childcare Payments Act 
2014 
30
 will replace the employer voucher system with childcare tax subsidies in 2017 for those 
earning up to £150 000 per annum, one of the main stated objectives of which is to reduce childcare 
costs to working parents. There is a limit on payment of £2000 per child but no limit on the number 
of children under 12 who can be claimed for. For those on lower to middle incomes, there has been 
some vacillation in policy settings: in April 2011 there was in fact a reduction in the percentage of 
costs covered by child tax credits from the previous 80 back to the original 70 per cent. However, 
following pressure from societal actors - opinion polls showed that this decision was particularly 
unpopular with low- to middle- income women voters - this was offset by extending access to 
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 http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/childcarepayments.html 
childcare tax credits to parents working less than 16 hours a week who had not been eligible before. 
Furthermore, from April 2016 the childcare element of Universal Credit which will eventually replace 
child tax credits for the whole population, was raised to cover 85 per cent of costs for families where 
both parents earn enough to reach the tax threshold. However, there has been an area of work-
family reconciliation provision which has suffered cutbacks in the UK since 2008, namely, direct 
provision of nursery and childcare services by local authorities since failure to ring-fence expenditure 
on nurseries, after-school or holiday clubs by local authorities in the context of budget cuts has had a 
deleterious effect on provision. A study released in June 2013 by the 4 Children and Daycare Trust 
shows that cuts to the Sure Start programme had led to a loss of 250 community nurseries whilst a 
ヮ;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴ aヴﾗﾏ デｴWﾐ CｴｷﾉSI;ヴW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ Lｷ┣ Tヴ┌ゲゲ IﾗﾐIWSWS デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ 
centres providing full day care fell from 800 in 2010 to 550 in 2011.  
It is clear, therefore, that childcare support in the UK largely survived the stringent austerity 
measures implemented in other areas of social spending by the Coalition and Conservative 
governments despite this area of provision not having the long-standing history that it does in 
France with steps taken to improve affordability particularly of early-years education for three and 
four year olds and some improvements targeted at lower-income families for younger children. That 
said, austerity has also served to reinforce a liberal policy model based on market-provided care.  
The question begs of why childcare provision was not more adversely affected given the severity of 
the austerity cuts in other areas? A number of factors come into play in answer to this question: very 
importantly, the UK had witnessed partisan convergence as regards childcare provision since 2005. 
In contrast to France, the very existence of work-family reconciliation policy had been a politically 
Sｷ┗ｷゲｷ┗W ｷゲゲ┌W ┌ﾐデｷﾉ デｴW ヲヰヰヵ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ WﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴWﾐ デｴW CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗Wゲ HWI;ﾏW さIﾗﾐゲWﾐデWヴゲざ デﾗ NW┘ 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆ-family policy (Macleavy, 2011). The Conservatives could easily frame investment in 
childcare within their thinking on reducing welfare dependency and poverty through an active 
ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞が ; ヮﾗｷﾐデ ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲデヴ;デWS ｷﾐ D;┗ｷS C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐげゲ ;ﾐﾐﾗ┌ﾐIWﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐW┘ ヱヵ ｴﾗ┌ヴゲ 
W┝デヴ; IｴｷﾉSI;ヴW aﾗヴ ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴヴWW ;ﾐS aﾗ┌ヴ ┞W;ヴ ﾗﾉSゲ ;ｷﾏWS デﾗ さぷｴWﾉヮへ ｴ;ヴS┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲ 
and giv[e] peoヮﾉW デｴW ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデ┞ デﾗ ｪWデ ｷﾐデﾗ ┘ﾗヴﾆくざ 31   However, a further key reason for this 
change of heart was that work-family reconciliation was one of a number of policy areas that the 
Conservatives in opposition had needed to address to become electable as socio-economic changes 
in the form of growing female labour-force participation and changing social attitudes around 
motherhood and employment had contributed to a reversal of the gender gap in voting and rising 
partisan competition over female voters (Morgan, 2013). Indeed, quite dramatic changes in public 
ﾗヮｷﾐｷﾗﾐ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ｴ;S デ;ﾆWﾐ ヮﾉ;IW ﾗ┗Wヴ デｴW ヮWヴｷﾗSぎ ┘ｴWヴW;ゲ ｷﾐ ヱΓΒΓが ヶヴ ヮWヴ 
cent of respondents to the British Household Attitudes Survey thought that women should stay at 
home when a child is under school age only 33 per cent were of this opinion by 2012 (Park et al, 
2012). Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the business lobby has been strongly in favour of childcare 
ｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ゲｷﾐIW ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ ; ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa Iﾗヮｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐデｷIｷヮ;デWS ﾉabour shortages 
associated with demographic change and makes a contribution to the competitiveness of UK 
businesses as women constitute a significant pool of labour for low-skill occupations and are more 
prepared to work flexibly than men (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). In 2015 all major parties 
proposed to increase free childcare for working parents within the overarching legitimating ideas of 
increasing the active labour force to address poverty, particularly child poverty and of improving life 
chances through early education rather than gender equality. These legitimating ideas had in fact 
been given new impetus by the economic crisis and austerity and the ensuing reshaping of the 
welfare state that the Coalition and Conservatives undertook.  




In the preceding discussions, it has been shown that work-family reconciliation policy in both France 
and the UK showed resilience in the face of the economic and budgetary problems encountered 
post-2008 confirming results of previous research. There have been significant first-, second- and 
arguably third-order changes in policy over this time period which have begun to degender parental 
leave and improve affordability of and access to childcare services in France and the UK, albeit in 
path-dependent ways. As regards parental leave, the UK introduced the SPL offering extended leave 
to fathers for the first time and France included a father quota into the PreParE, the first family 
policy targeting directly the choices of fathers. Although neither Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ ┞Wデ a┌ﾉaｷﾉゲ “;┝ﾗﾐHWヴｪげゲ 
(2013) criteria for a fully degendered parental leave policy of having a father quota and a benefit 
paid at percentage of previous income, both made progress in this direction and it can be suggested 
that these policy changes represent the beginnings of third-order change in both countries, 
indicative of a move away from a maternalist objective of helping mothers to combine child rearing 
and employment and towards one of promoting father involvement in childcare and more gender-
equal sharing of earning and caring roles (Mazur, 2002). As regards formal childcare provision, 
France continued with ambitious plans to improve childcare coverage for the under threes in the 
country, particularly for deprived areas, and to cater for the low paid by providing more local-
authority run crèche places which are means-tested and therefore more affordable for low-income 
families. However, the economic and budgetary situation has slowed progress in achieving these 
goals. The country already enjoyed 100 per cent child care coverage for the early-years education of 
3-5 year olds. The UK again started from a lower base line of provision but has introduced free hours 
of nursery care for poorer two-year olds and from 2017 will double those available for dual-earner 
or single employed parents of three- and four-year olds whilst a new system for tax relief for 
childcare costs is also coming into force. Provision, however, is now more firmly rooted than before 
in the private sector as local-authority run facilities have experienced cut backs. Applying Matzke 
;ﾐS OゲデﾐWヴげゲ ふヲヰヱヰ;き ヲヰヱHぶ aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾆ-family reconciliation policy 
to the economic crisis and austerity, in the case of France we can point to the long history of 
provision in the country which has adapted to changing socio-economic circumstances and been 
embedded in the high degree of legitimacy given to state intervention in the family. Increasing 
formal childcare provision has had a wide support base: there is partisan consensus on this issue and 
support from the bureaucratic family policy-making elite, organised interests such as family 
;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲが ;ﾐS ｷﾐSWWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ヮ┌HﾉｷIく ‘Waﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ヮ;ヴWﾐデ;ﾉ ﾉW;┗W ｴ;ゲ 
been more contested, as will be discussed below. Furthermore, the shift in employment policy under 
Sarkozy from work-sharing to increasing the active labour force have reinforced the need for more 
childcare coverage and parental leave reform. In the UK, despite the relative novelty of work-family 
reconciliation policy, again there is now wide societal and political espousal of a role for the state in 
supporting a secure position for mothers in the labour force and providing early-years education as 
aspects of a social-investment and activation approach to work and welfare. There is partisan 
consensus on this issue, support from the important business community for formal childcare if not 
for parental leave and changed public attitudes backing maternal employment. Very important has 
been the ideological change in the Conservative party which was in turn heavily influenced by the 
ﾐWWS デﾗ ;デデヴ;Iデ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ ┗ﾗデW aﾗヴ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘ﾗヴﾆ-family provisions are key.  
All that said, the economic crisis and recession have affected work-family policy in both countries in 
differing ways and to differing degrees. In the UK, the economic crisis was used by the Coalition 
government as the frame to justify remodelling welfare provision along more liberal lines. The shape 
of work-family reconciliation policy which has emerged from these post-2010 changes reflects this 
more general trend with childcare now based more exclusively on market rather than state 
provision, the extension of nursery vouchers to two-year olds targeted only at the lower paid, all of 
this  justified within a  discourse of business need and activation rather than gender equality. 
Furthermore, the Conservative government is showing a reluctance to intervene in family life in a 
coercive way in the name of gender equality. In France, the economic and budgetary situation has 
had a more direct impact on policy. From 2011 onwards, there has been a wide consensus in France 
across a range of actors in favour of reducing parental leave to one year, remunerating it at a 
percentage of previous income as well as having a father quota, this reduction in entitlement 
compensated for by extra childcare provision for the under threes. This policy proposal enjoyed 
partisan consensus and was supported by the powerful bureaucratic family-policy elite. However, a 
major obstacles to these changes being implemented has been lack of finance.  That said, spending 
choices are not made in a vacuum and also important in constraining policy change in this regard has 
HWWﾐ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW さSﾗ┌HﾉW aヴWW IｴﾗｷIWざ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;ゲ Iｴ;ヴ;Iデerised French work-family 
reconciliation policy since the 1990s based on long parental leaves which is reinforced by the 
intervention of powerful interest groups such as the UNAF , meaning that governments run electoral 
risks if they act to curtail this choice, especially when the economic situation itself renders their 
electoral chances fragile. 
In sum, therefore, by looking at these contrasting case studies in detail, it has been possible to see 
how the economic crisis and austerity have combined with a variety of other policy drivers in path-
dependent ways to shape reconciliation policy in each country,  acting as a context influencing the 
definition of policy goals and proposals;  contributing to the degree of influence of particular societal 
and political actors; as well as being direct material constraints on the enactment of policy.  
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